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The political ‘centre’ is often discussed in debates about public policy and analyses of party strategies
and election outcomes. Yet, to date, there has been little effort to estimate the political centre outside
the United States. This article outlines a method of estimating the political centre using public opinion
data collected for the period between 1950 and 2005. It is demonstrated that it is possible to measure
the centre in Britain, that it moves over time, that it shifts in response to government activity and,
furthermore, that it has an observable association with general election outcomes.
The fundamental driving forces in democracy are the preferences of citizens across a wide
range of issues. These preferences, together with other factors, inﬂuence the decisions of
individual voters. Elections aggregate those individual preferences, however imperfectly,
into collective choices. The aggregation of preferences across issues and across individuals,
therefore, lies at the very heart of the democratic process.1 And since electoral choices are
structured by political parties that tend to compete primarily along a single left–right
dimension relating to the scope of government activity, it is just a small step to arguing that
these preferences can be summarized by a measure of central tendency such as the ‘typical’,
‘average’, ‘mean’, ‘median’ or ‘political centre’.2
The political centre is a concept of enormous political importance. Political theorists
maintain that, if politics is unidimensional, the median voter is the ‘Condorcet winner’
in the sense that a policy package that suits this individual would defeat all others in a
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series of pairwise contests.3 Analytical political scientists, moreover, argue that if party
competition takes place along a single dimension, ofﬁce-seeking parties will occupy the
same position as the median voter at the centre.4 Where policy is the only basis for choice,
the party that wins the support of the median voter will win the election. But even when
there are other non-policy factors in play, such as partisanship or valence issue
advantages, the party that occupies the centre ground is advantaged in the competitive
struggle for the vote.5 The centre is also of direct signiﬁcance to politicians and parties
that compete for ofﬁce. Not only does being at the centre produce electoral advantages, it
has a special moral signiﬁcance too. Unsurprisingly, almost every electoral politician feels
the need to stake some claim to the centre ground.6 Indeed, the very declaration that a
politician or party occupies the centre ground appears to carry with it an implicit promise
that they will represent (and respond to) the preferences of the electorate.
Democracy is said to be uniquely virtuous because it is the only system in which there
is a necessary relationship between the preferences of voters and public policy.7
Nevertheless, citizen preferences are also undoubtedly inﬂuenced by the activities of
government itself and – since government policy changes – they also change over time.
Christopher Wlezien’s ‘thermostatic’ model of political preferences, for example, suggests
that the electorate has a preferred (or ideal) policy point in relation to speciﬁc policy
domains.8 When the government spends ‘too little’, demand for additional expenditure
increases and, when it spends ‘too much’, the demand for additional expenditure declines.
Public preferences respond ‘thermostatically’ (i.e., move in the opposite direction) to
government policy. This model has been handsomely corroborated in Christopher
Wlezien’s and Stuart Soroka’s studies of expenditure and public preferences in speciﬁc
policy domains (such as defence, health, education and roads) in Britain.9 The model
can, however, be generalized across the whole of government and leads to the expectation
that the political centre will itself move over time in response to government activity. It
might be supposed, for example, that as the need for government activity increases (as
unemployment rises or the quality of public services declines), the electorate might begin
to prefer greater activity and move on average to the left.10 Similarly, as inﬂation
3 Anthony McGann, The Logic of Democracy: Reconciling equality, Deliberation and Minority
Protection (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), chap. 2.
4 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957); Samuel
Merrill III and Bernard Grofman, A Uniﬁed Theory of Voting: Directional and Proximity Spatial Models
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
5 James Adams, Samuel Merrill and Bernard Grofman, A Uniﬁed Theory of Party Competition: A
Cross-National Analysis Integrating Spatial and Behavioural Factors (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005).
6 See Gordon Pascoe-Watson, ‘No left turns for deputy PM’, Sun, 31 May 2007; and David Cameron
speech ‘We Stand for Social Responsibility’, 1 October 2006, http://www.conservatives.com/
tile.do?def5news.story.page&obj_id5132485.
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increases and taxes rise due to increased government activity, the electorate might prefer
less government activity and move on average to the right. These movements in the
political centre may eventually feed through into the choices of the electorate. Indeed, if
this stylized model were true, it would provide the basis for a parsimonious explanation as
to why the major parties have alternated in power in the post-war period.
The concept of the political centre is central to general theories and general models of
electoral competition, election outcomes and citizen preferences. To date, however, many of
these hypotheses have gone untested. The reasons for this are simply stated. The raw
materials that are necessary to measure ‘average’ public preferences – survey evidence about
mass opinion – are in short supply until the mid to late 1960s when the commercial polling
industry expanded and social scientiﬁc studies, such as the British Election Study, were
established.11 Yet even when survey evidence is more plentiful in this later period, the data
collected often do not relate to preferences about government activity of the sort associated
with the left–right dimension. And even when the data do touch on these issues, the relevant
questions are rarely repeated in precisely the same form, making it difﬁcult to infer whether
speciﬁc preferences actually have changed, let alone whether they have moved to the left (in
favour of more government activity) or to the right (in favour of less government activity).
Despite the best endeavours of many ﬁne political scientists, therefore, movements in the
political centre have gone unmeasured and the ﬁeld has largely been left to historians who
make informed speculations about the ebb and ﬂow of public opinion.12
To date, the only systematic attempt to estimate the political centre has taken place in
the United States.13 This research has demonstrated that, despite the existence of similar
data problems, it is possible to track changes in the political centre, that these changes
respond to changes in unemployment and inﬂation, that the distance between the average
voter and presidential candidates has a sizeable effect on election outcomes between 1948
and 1996 and, ﬁnally, that policy outcomes respond to prior movements in these
preferences.14 In this article, we build on these studies by replicating the methodology of
estimating the ‘policy mood’ in Britain and by making use of data on public preferences
collected between 1950 and 2005. Our ﬁndings provide corroboration for these US
studies. We show that it is possible to measure the political centre in Britain; that the
political centre moves over time, that the centre responds thermostatically to government
activity and, furthermore, that it appears to have an observable association with general
election outcomes. These ‘macro-level’ ﬁndings provide an interesting analytic counterpoint
to the standard ‘micro-studies’ of British general elections.
11 See Frank Teer and James D. Spence, Political Opinion Polls (London: Hutchinson, 1973); Robert
M. Worcester, British Public Opinion: A Guide to the History and Methodology of Political Opinion Polling
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991); Robert M. Worcester, ‘Pollsters, the Press, and Political Polling in
Britain’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 44 (1980), 548–66; Robert M. Worcester, ‘The Polls: Britain at the
Polls, 1945–1983’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 48 (1984), 824–33.
12 David Sanders, ‘The Impact of Left–Right Ideology’, in Geoffrey Evans and Pippa Norris, eds,
Critical Elections: British Parties and Voters in Long-Term Perspective (London: Sage, 1999), pp.181–206;
Hugh Ward, ‘Preference Shaping and Party Competition: Some Empirical and Theoretical Arguments’, in
Judith Bara and Albert Weale, eds, Democratic Politics and Party Competition (London: Routledge,
2006), pp. 245–70.
13 James Stimson, Public Opinion in America: Moods, Cycles and Swings. (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview, 1999); James Stimson, Tides of Consent: How Public Opinion Shapes American Politics.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
14 James A. Stimson, Michael B. Mackuen and Robert S. Erikson. ‘Dynamic Representation’,
American Political Science Review, 89 (1995), 543–65; Erikson et al. The Macro Polity.
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THE CONCEPTS OF THE POLICY MOOD AND THE POLITICAL CENTRE
The key concept in US studies is labelled ‘policy mood’. This concept is based on the
general proposition that aggregation of variables cuts out inessential detail and allows
analysts to examine the systemic relationships between preferences and policy and
between policy and preferences. Somewhat more directly, however, it is inspired by
Walter Lippmann’s observation that ‘since out of drift and incoherence, settled aims do
appear, there must be a mysterious contrivance at work somewhere over and above the
inhabitants of a nation. They invoke a collective soul, a national mind, a spirit of the age
which imposes order upon random opinion.’15
The suggestion that ‘settled aims’ emerge among the public is equally familiar to
analysts of public policy. John Kingdon, for example, has observed:
People in and around government sense a national mood. They are comfortable discussing its
content and believe that they know when the mood shifts. The idea goes by different namesy
But common to ally is the notion that a rather large number of people out in the country are
thinking along certain lines, that this national mood changes from one time to another in
discernible ways, and that these changes in mood or the climate have important impacts on
policy agendas and policy outcomes.16
If policy makers can sense variations in ‘mood’, we should also be able to ﬁnd some traces
of this among the mass public’s responses to the many individual responses to survey
questions. This proposition is supported by modern theories of survey response such
as John Zaller’s Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) model.17 This model challenges the
assumption that respondents have fully worked-out opinions on speciﬁc issues. Instead, it
suggests that responses to questions in speciﬁc domains – or on highly speciﬁc issues in
speciﬁc domains – may be based on a small number of general considerations. Since we
know from other sources, such as the analyses of the Manifesto Research Group, that
parties tend to structure issues in terms of left and right, it seems plausible to suggest that
responses to a wide range of survey questions might well reﬂect the enduring debate about
the scope of government activity or what is usually called the left–right dimension.18 If
preferences that relate to these issues are measured over time, then variations in these
preferences should reﬂect variations in this underlying (or latent) variable. And if we
could somehow infer this latent variable, we could see how it varies over time. This is the
simple intuition on which previous US research is based.
The concept of ‘the policy mood’ is now widely used in studies of American public
opinion and is one of the central variables in The Macro Polity, which is the most
ambitious systemic model of the American political system produced to date.19 Yet
though the term ‘mood’ has now entered into the political science lexicon, we prefer not to
use it here. This is simply because, while mood is appropriate in the context of policy
15 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Free Press, 1997), p. 127.
16 John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policy (Boston, Mass.: Little Brown, 1984),
p. 153. See also George Orwell, Orwell: The Observer Years (London: Atlantic Books, 2004), pp. 4–5.
17 John R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1992). See also James A. Stimson, ‘The Micro Foundations of Mood’, in James H. Kuklinski, ed.,
Thinking about Political Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 253–80.
18 Ian Budge, ‘Identifying Dimensions and Locating Parties: Methodological and Conceptual
Problems’, in Richard S. Katz and William Crotty, eds, Handbook of Party Politics (London: Sage,
2006), pp. 422–34.
19 Erikson et al., The Macro Polity.
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analysis, it has unfortunate connotations of transient or superﬁcial sentiment or emotions.
The word ‘mood’ hardly seems appropriate to describe something that is thought – at
least by some – to be the fundamental driving force of democratic politics. Therefore, we
prefer to use the term ‘preferences’ to underline the relationship between this variable and
other important variables such as vote shares and public policy.20 We use the term
‘political centre’ to describe the mean value of this variable and we expect to ﬁnd that this
varies over time.
The outline of the argument is relatively simply stated but the measurement or
estimation of the political centre is far more difﬁcult, since it requires a large amount of
data and a prodigious amount of computational effort. In the next section, we examine
the data that provide the basis for our estimate, and in the following section we explain
how the algorithm uses this evidence to extract the latent variable.
DATA
At ﬁrst sight, the term ‘the political centre’ appears to illustrate perfectly Converse’s
proposition ‘that those things that are important to study cannot be measured and what
can be measured does not really matter’.21 Yet without some operational indicator, the
concept of the centre remains a verbal sticking plaster to conceal our ignorance. In this
article, we estimate the centre using all the available evidence collected since 1950 about
longitudinal covariation in public preferences. We use an algorithm modelled on principal
components analysis to extract the latent common component. Such bald statements,
however, conceal a great deal. The following subsections accordingly provide further
detail about data and methods.
The Preferences Database
Our preferences database is made up of the marginal responses to survey questions
relating to domestic policy issues.22 These simply record the percentage selecting a ‘left’ or
‘right’ option, ‘supporting’ or ‘opposing’ speciﬁc proposals, ‘agreeing’ or ‘disagreeing’
with social, economic and political statements. In each case, respondents are required to
take ‘sides’ or ‘positions’.23 We exclude items relating to the foreign affairs policy domain
20 See James A. Stimson, ‘Public Policy Mood: A Personal Narrative’, Political Methodologist, 12
(2004), pp. 9–14, at p. 12.
21 Philip E. Converse, ‘Belief Systems in Mass Publics’ in David Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent
(New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 209–64, at p. 209.
22 Further questions and administrations have been added to the dataset. As of 28 March 2007, it
contained 481 questions. This database, together with the estimated preferences for government activity,
will be deposited with the Data Archive at the University of Essex.
23 It has been suggested by some reviewers that the meaning of the ‘middle’ or supposed ‘neutral’
response might vary over time and that this might cast some doubt on our coding case. The classic case
that such reviewers would seem to have in mind would be the ‘keep things as they are’ response option
that is available to respondents on various tax and spending questions. When a right-wing party is in
power, for example, it might be supposed that those who select this option might be revealing conservative
attitudes towards change. This might well be the case for some questions and some respondents. It may
well be that we could improve our estimates were we able to incorporate such reﬁnements. Identifying the
sort of questions for which this might be a problem would however be subjective and identifying the time
at which the meaning of the neutral category changes would inject a degree of subjectivity. In any event,
our method relies on covariation across a range of items, many of which do not conceivably suffer from
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since prior research has suggested that this represents a highly distinctive dimension that
does not correlate with domestic preferences.24 We similarly exclude those questions that
refer to a named party or politician. This is simply because the presence of such a cue
makes it difﬁcult to untangle preferences (or attitudes towards government activity) from
attitude to either party or politician.
After we have imposed all these limitations, the full preferences database contains
responses to a total of 441 individual questions related to domestic policy administered a
total of 3,151 times. However, for reasons set out below, preferences are estimated using a
subset made up of 349 items administered a total number of 2,482 times. The remaining
items are used to validate our estimates of the centre.
Changes in Preferences
Our measure of political preferences is based on observing changes in the distribution
of domestic policy preferences over time. Thus, the preferences dataset includes only
identical questions asked in at least two separate years. This requirement means
dispensing with notable transient issues, such as the ‘poll tax’ in the late 1980s, because
the same questions were, as far as we have been able to establish, never repeated in two
separate years. Since even minor variations in question wording, question order, ﬁlter
style and response categories can produce different responses, we treat such difference as
creating different items that cannot be compared over time.25 In some cases, very minor
variations in question wording were tolerated, especially in the 1950s when data were in
short supply. We also generally treated different modes (face-to-face, telephone, self-
completion questionnaires, etc.) as producing incomparable items.
Coverage
The measure of the policy preferences that we develop in this article is based on all the
domestic policy preference data that were available in the Gallup Political Index, British
Election Studies (BES), National Opinion Poll (NOP), International Communications
and Marketing (ICM), British Social Attitudes (BSA), British Household Panel Study
(BHPS), the European Social Survey, Eurobarometer and YouGov (see Table 1). Our
search was both lengthy and intensive and so the collection is – within the limits of what
one can know – exhaustive.
The market research industry is still relatively new and subject to change as a result
of market conditions and technological change. There are few useful questions in the
1930s, 1940s and even 1950s, when we are reliant on the (now sadly defunct) Gallup
Political Index.26 Accordingly, we discount our estimates before 1950. Even then,
however, the data are thin. We have to rely on a single item in 1950 and 1956 and just four
(F’note continued)
this problem. For the moment – just as with the European preference series – we prefer to maintain a
degree of consistency and focus on those responses that clearly take ‘sides’.
24 This excludes very few questions. British pollsters and political scientists have focused largely on
domestic affairs in their questionnaires.
25 Howard Schumann and Stanley Presser, Questions and Answers in Attitude Surveys: Experiments on
Question Form, Wording and Context (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1996); Zaller, The Nature and Origins
of Mass Opinion.
26 See George H. Gallup, The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls, Great Britain, 1937–1975
(London: Random House, 1976), 2 volumes.
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in 1953.27 As we move closer to the present day, however, we face an embarrassment of
data riches. The peak in terms of both number of questions (N5 147) and separate
administrations (N5 161) is 1987, but is still healthy in 2005 (N5 87 in terms of both
questions and administrations). We have fully-exploited Gallup, the only possible source
of data for the 1950s. Nevertheless, the few items that are available in the 1950s relate to
issues such as trade unions and nationalization and – as we demonstrate below – these
sorts of items tend to load very heavily on our extracted preference series. Preferences
have been so well documented since the 1970s, moreover, that new bits of data are
unlikely to make much difference.
As a check on the impact of small numbers of items ﬁrst and foremost, we have
estimated standard errors of our annual estimates. We can estimate a biennial rather than
annual time series to see if the main patterns are altered when twice as many items
contribute to each estimate. That exercise produces no notable changes.
Indexing Preferences
In order to estimate preferences for government activity, responses were simply coded as
either ‘left’ or ‘right’ and ‘neutral’. The latter were discarded from the analysis and an
index of preferences calculated:
Index of Preferences ¼
PN
i¼1
ðLeft PreferencesÞ
PN
i¼1
ðLeft andRight PreferencesÞ
:
TABLE 1 Sources Used in This Research
Questions Administrations
No. % N %
British Election Panel Study 6 1.4 42 1.4
British Election Study 82 18.8 289 9.6
British Social Attitudes 165 37.8 1085 36.0
Eurobarometer 3 0.7 80 2.7
Gallup 128 29.4 1056 35.0
ICM 15 3.4 158 5.2
MORI 18 4.1 227 7.5
NOP 5 1.1 38 1.3
World Values Survey 6 1.4 19 0.6
YouGov 8 1.8 22 0.7
Total 436 100 3016 100
Note: Based on June 2007 database (excluding foreign policy items)
27 It should be noted, however, that we are relying here on important questions about trade unions and
nationalization, probably the key issues deﬁning the political battleground of the time. These sorts of
items tend to load very heavily on our estimated preference series, something that boosts our conﬁdence in
our measure for these earlier years.
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In general, it is a simple task to decide on the directional thrust of the responses. That
is, it was easy to code responses as ‘left’ or ‘right’. This is hardly surprising. British
politicians have ‘framed’ many issues in terms of ‘left’ and ‘right’ and survey designers
have taken note, thus allowing easy coding of responses.28 Moreover, even if we made a
mistake in coding, the extraction algorithm would still be able to use the information as
long as we had been consistent.
The only major coding difﬁculty relates to Europe, which has been the subject of data
collection efforts since British entry was ﬁrst ﬂoated in 1961. This policy domain arguably
lies somewhere between a ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign affairs’ issue, though as integration has
increased ‘Europe’ has had a greater impact on domestic policy. The issue has also created
divisions on both the left and right for the best part of forty years. The bulk of ‘the right’
tended to support membership of the then European Economic Community and the
formation of the single market under the European Community in the 1980s.29 As the
European Union challenged national sovereignty by moving towards monetary union and
developing a ‘social dimension’, however, many on the right became sceptical about the
European project. After Mrs Thatcher’s removal from ofﬁce in November 1990, much of the
Conservative party drifted to a far more sceptical position and some joined explicitly anti-
European parties such as the Referendum Party and the United Kingdom Independence
Party. ‘The left’, by contrast, were hopelessly divided on Europe until the late 1980s.30 The
left tended to oppose membership of the ‘capitalist club’, while moderate social democrats
tended to enthusiastically support membership.31 It was not until the emergence of a ‘social
dimension’ in the early 1990s that being pro-Europe became a ‘left’ position.
Given the detailed knowledge of the European issue, it is tempting to impose the
assumption that the ‘polarities’ reversed at some speciﬁc date. But pinpointing the exact
date would be hazardous and require a ﬁne judgement call. Rather than do this, we
(tentatively) code pro-European responses as left and anti-European responses as right.
We do not, however, include European items in our estimate of preferences for
government activity. This allows us to observe, rather than assume, the relationship
between left–right and European preferences.
Self-Reported Left–Right Positions
The most obvious way of estimating voters’ left–right positions is to ask voters to locate
themselves on a general left–right scale. At the individual level at least, this method is
problematic. Responses to such questions do not express clear preferences over outcomes.
They may be empirically related to outcomes but – on the face of it at least – refer simply
to the labels that people may attach to themselves. While the small group of politically
sophisticated voters may use these labels correctly, the great mass of unsophisticated
citizens may not know how to use the labels or know what they mean.32 Indeed, it is all
28 In some cases, the inclusion of the phrase ‘the government’ causes problems because it is not always
clear whether the question will be interpreted as meaning the present government or government in
general. We have included such questions in those cases where it seems to refer to government in general.
29 Hugo Young, This Blessed Plot (London: Macmillan, 1998); Anthony Forster, Euroscepticism in
Contemporary British Politics (London: Routledge, 2002).
30 Tom Nairn, The Left Against Europe? (London: Penguin, 1973).
31 This represents a heroic generalization. For exceptions, see Young, This Blessed Plot, chap. 5.
32 See Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Kathleen Knight and Lee Sigelman, ‘The Interplay between Macro-
Partisanship and Macro-Ideology: A Time Series Study’, Journal of Politics, 60 (1998), 1031–49; Janet M.
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too likely that many may guess or infer their left–right position from their understandings
of where their parties are located.33
Still, it could be argued that, at the aggregate level, these things wash out and that
ideological self-location should track real preferences. Variations in reported self-location
may, therefore, approximate shifts in preferences. In order to produce a somewhat cleaner
set of estimates that is less vulnerable to challenge, however, we exclude these measures
from the preferences for government activity series, and – just as with European
preferences – we use self-reported left–right positions only to validate these estimates.
In the event, neither of these decisions – to omit European preferences and left–right
self-locations – have signiﬁcant empirical consequences. Indeed, they hardly affect our
estimates of the political centre at all.
ESTIMATING THE MOVING CENTRE
Our goal is to locate that – hitherto – mythical median British voter and track him or her
over time as preferences change to reﬂect circumstances. Our device for doing so is (1) to
observe raw preferences as expressed in aggregate responses to survey probes about
preferred policy choices and (2) to solve for their moving central tendency over time.
Policy preferences vary across people and over time. Our interest is only the latter. Thus,
at the outset, we score policy preferences as a net disposition across the whole of British
society, typically as a percentage choosing the left option (or options) in a question that
offers both left and right choices.34 Then we observe how that percentage varies over time.
The issue then becomes how to extract the central tendency from a very large number of
observed preference series. This is of the class of problems to which principal components
analysis – or more loosely, factor analysis – is the solution. Principal components analysis
itself is not workable for data of this sort because most of the possible cases – the answers
to a potential survey question in year t – are missing. To impute values for those missing
cases, which considerably outnumber observed cases, would create a dangerous dependency
on the assumptions underlying the imputation. In some cases, those assumptions are
relatively benign; for example, a missing year might be well imputed as an average of
the years before and after. In many cases, the assumptions are heroic. Imputation might
be required to create values for a question series, for example, before it was ever posed the
ﬁrst time and after it was posed the last time.
To deal with the actual structure of the public opinion data we have, we adopt the Dyad
Ratios algorithm.35 We describe the algorithm brieﬂy here for readers who are not
familiar with it. We begin with the data.
(F’note continued)
Box-Steffensmeier and Suzanna De Boef, ‘Macropartisanship and Macroideology in the Sophisticated
Electorate’, Journal of Politics, 63 (2001), 232–48. This paper suggests that ‘for the politically
sophisticated group, there was a connection between macropartisanship and macroideology’, p. 245.
33 Elinor Scarbrough, Political Ideology and Voting Behaviour: An Exploratory Study (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1984).
34 One might reasonably ask how we can observe the ‘median’ when we have discarded the distribution
of individual responses. The answer is that we cannot. What we actually do is solve for the central
tendency of preferences and then interpret that result as the preferences of the median voter.
35 The algorithm is developed in Stimson, Public Opinion in America. It has been used in various studies
including Jeffrey E. Cohen, ‘The Polls: Public Favourability toward the First Lady’, Presidential Studies
Quarterly, 30 (2000), 575–85; Virginia A. Chanley, Thomas J. Rudolph and Wendy M. Rahn, ‘The Origins
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What we have for data are numerous series of a single survey item posed to comparable
national samples at various times. We wish to estimate the centre for N years (here N5 56)
from input data series each of length k, where k is always less than N. We wish to avoid the
untenable assumptions (1) that any two different questions are or are not comparable, and
(2) that anything can be known about a series in a year that it is not posed.
What that leaves as bedrock knowledge is the assertion that ratios of the responses to
the same question at different times are useful information about opinion change.36 Each
of the two possible cases forms a dyad, and hence the name, dyad ratios algorithm. More
formally, assuming that each indicator series is scored to represent left opinion – i.e.,
larger numbers represent an opinion further to the left – we are asserting that for:
Rij ¼
xtþi
xtþj
:
Rij represents a reasonable estimate of how left opinion was in years t1i and t1j. This is
not to say that R is a ‘best’ or even ‘good’ estimate of the concept. For a ‘best’ estimate
will be efﬁcient in the sense that it is based upon all the information at hand and not
merely one arbitrary choice. For each series of length k, we have multiple ratio estimates.
These tell us plenty about the years for which the series is measured and nothing about the
years when it is not.
Note the gain from switching from raw measures (percentage left) to ratios. In the
case of raw measures, a missing case has an unknown expected value.37 For a ratio, in
contrast, the expected value of the ratio of any two cases is 1.0. That will justify combining
estimates derived from different subsets of indicators. No matter what question wording
is employed, two valid indicators of the same concept will have the same expected values
for ratios.
For multiple series, the question becomes how to combine a very large number of
possible ratios into a single estimate. If – a very big if – a single year i were available for all
series, then it could serve as a universal base that would give meaning to all the ratios.
This is the logic of economic indicators in which a base year is given an arbitrary value,
often 100, which then propagates meaningful values to all other years. But this condition
is not satisﬁed by our data. There is no one year where every possible survey question
about preferences is posed.
That forces us to choose a next best solution, recursive estimation. Since there is no
universal base year for calculation, we form recursive estimates of each year from all the
available data pertaining to that year. Thus, we cannot know that Year 2, for example, is 100.
(F’note continued)
and Consequences of Public Trust in Government: A Time Series Analysis’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 64
(2000), 239–56; Erikson et al., The Macro Polity, chaps 6 and 7; Paul M. Kellstedt, The Mass Media and the
Dynamics of American Racial Attitudes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Erik Voeten and Paul
R. Brewer, ‘Public Opinion, the War in Iraq, and Presidential Accountability’, Journal of Conﬂict Resolution,
50 (2006), 809–30; Frank R. Baumgartner, Suzanna L. De Boef and Amber E. Boydstun, The Decline of the
Death Penalty and the Discovery of Innocence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
36 That depends, as always, on the degree to which each series is a valid indicator of the concept in
question, here left–right public opinion. This is a matter for which the empirical results will be
informative.
37 One might think that the problem is easily solved, that the mean of a series can serve as an expected
value. But this is an inﬁnite regress problem. Without either the full series or a random sample of it, we
have no valid estimate of that mean.
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But we can know that Year 2 is some computable ratio of Year 1, based on all the data
which are available for times 1 and 2. Thus, we let Year 1 be arbitrary, say 100, and then
calculate an average Year 1/Year 2 ratio from all the data that connect the two cases to
form a best estimate of Year 2 in absolute terms. Then this value can be similarly applied
to years 3, 4,y k in the same fashion. This is recursive estimation.
We now have in hand multiple – often multiple hundred – estimates of the same
quantity, the absolute leftness of preferences in a particular year, Pt. The large number of
overlapping estimates derives from the fact that each series provides k21 separate
estimates of each year where it is available and then there are hundreds of series. A
natural ﬁrst intuition about combining these separate estimates, xtk, is to ﬁnd their central
tendency (denoted Pt for preferences at time t):
Pt ¼
PN
k¼1
xtk
N
But we can do better than that. We know that the items in the analysis are not equally
valid indicators of the concept, left–right. Therefore, we can estimate those validities –
squared correlations with the latent dimension – and use those estimates to weight items
in proportion to their indicator validity, hi
2:
Pt ¼
PN
k¼1
h2i xtk
h2N
where hi
2 in the numerator is the communality estimate (i.e., validity) of item i and h2 in
the denominator is the average communality across all items.
Recursive estimation can be done forward in time, as described above, or equally well
backward. In that case, year T is set to 100 and all earlier years are estimated empirically.
The two approaches weight earlier and later cases differently, so that the resulting
estimates are not the same. That permits reliability estimation (from the correlations of
the two). A ﬁnal estimate averages the two equally valid approaches.
In principal components, there are three common approaches to the thorny issue of
estimating the common variances of individual items. One is to assume (falsely in all
actual cases) that each is perfectly valid, in which case 1.0 is the communality estimate
placed on the major diagonal of the correlation matrix. A second forms the communality
estimate from the R2 of each indicator regressed on all the others. And a third, usually
preferred, approach is iterative. Each iteration begins with assumed communalities from
which improved ones can be estimated. Then the improved estimates become assumed
values for the next iteration. And so on until convergence is achieved when the difference
between the assumed and the estimated is arbitrarily small. The dyad ratios algorithm
implements the third, iterative, approach.
Since the recourse to ratios causes the original metric to be lost, it is reintroduced to
ease interpretation by a standardization of the latent scale in terms of the validity-
weighted means and standard deviations of the input items. Since the individual items are
scored as per cent left over per cent left plus per cent right, the resulting scale has the same
interpretation. Fifty is a neutral point where left and right alternatives are chosen with
equal frequency. Values above 50 indicate a net preference for the left and below 50 a net
preference for the right.
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The outcome data, as in principal components, tell us for each item how much of its
variance is shared with the latent estimated dimension, i.e., its validity, and how heavily it
loads on each possible dimension. The latter we employ in the manner of all dimensional
analyses to learn what the latent dimensions mean.38
THE EXTRACTED ESTIMATES
Having laid bare the technology, we turn our attention to the estimates. Figure 1 displays
our estimate of the public preferences series from 1950 through to 2005. This represents
our best estimate of the ‘centre’ in the post-war period. The series starts off high (left) in
1950s and then generally drifts down (right). Pleasingly, this overall pattern seems to
agree with several widely praised historical commentaries. In his A History of Modern
Britain, for example, Andrew Marr claims that the Second World War ‘changed Britain’s
political climate and our attitude to government’ and that by 1945 the mood was for ‘big
government, digging deep into people’s lives to improve them.’39 He then (rightly) claims
that ‘by the time the last big struggle to nationalise an industry was underway, the steel
debates of 1948–49, the public mood was already turning’ and that ‘the government felt a
change in the weather’.40 Preferences generally continued to drift right until 1979, the very
year that Mrs Thatcher came to power.
Our ﬁnding here ties in well with the research of Ivor Crewe and his colleagues, who
noted a decline in support for the ‘collectivist trinity’ of public ownership, trade unions
and the welfare state from the 1960s through to the 1979 general election.41 It also sheds
some light on why James Callaghan, then Labour leader and prime minister, conﬁded to
his policy adviser during the 1979 general election campaign: ‘You know there are times,
perhaps once every thirty years, when there is a sea-change in politics. It then does not
matter what you say or what you do. I suspect there is now such a sea change – and it is
for Mrs Thatcher.’42
Callaghan was clearly correct to say that there had been a ‘sea change’. As our evidence
makes clear, however, the change in preferences long pre-dated the speciﬁc circumstances
of the 1979 general election and the so-called ‘Winter of Discontent’ of 1978/79 that
immediately preceded it.
From 1979 onwards, the series tracks remorselessly to the left, peaking in 1997, the year
of New Labour’s triumph. This ﬁnding supports the ﬁndings of Crewe, Heath et al. and
Crewe and Searing, who ﬁnd that the electorate generally moved away from ‘Thatcherite’
38 The extraction algorithm can also be used to estimate a second dimension. This accounts for far less
of the variation in the longitudinal variation and is more difﬁcult to interpret. It does not, however,
appear to represent the sort of liberal–authoritarian dimension or ‘tough v. tender’ dimension of the sort
anticipated in the textbooks. We explore the issue of dimensionality further in John Bartle, Sebastian
Dellepiane and James A. Stimson, ‘The Dimensionality of British Political Preferences, 1950–2005’ (paper
presented at the 5th ECPR General Conference, Potsdam, 2009 – available from the authors).
39 Andrew Marr, A History of Modern Britain (Basingstoke, Hants.: Macmillan, 2007), p. xi, p. 28 and
p. 70.
40 Marr, A History of Modern Britain, p. 70.
41 Ivor Crewe, Bo Sa¨rlvik, B. and James Alt, ‘Partisan Dealignment in Britain ,1964–1974’, British
Journal of Political Science, 7 (1977), 129–90; Ivor Crewe, ‘The Labour Party and the Electorate’, in
Dennis Kavanagh, ed., The Politics of the Labour Party (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), pp.
9–49.
42 Bernard Donoghue, Prime Minister: The Conduct of Policy under Wilson and Callaghan (London:
Jonathan Cape, 1987), p. 191.
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positions during her period as prime minister.43 The series then drifts right again under
New Labour, until by 2005 it was roughly where it had been in 1983, the year when
Mrs Thatcher won a landslide victory.
The ﬁgure shows our best point estimate of left–right policy preferences along with an
estimated conﬁdence interval for each annual estimate, which is the point estimate plus or
minus two standard errors.44 The standard errors reﬂect how pivotal the various data
points are. Variations in particularly important years have relatively large consequences,
whereas in most years they do not.
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Fig. 1. Estimates of Left–Right Preferences with Conﬁdence Intervals, 1950–2005
43 Ivor Crewe, ‘Has the Electorate Become Thatcherite?’ in Robert Skidelsky, ed., Thatcherism
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1988), pp. 25–49; Ivor Crewe, ‘Values: The Crusade that Failed’, in Dennis
Kavanagh and Anthony Seldon, eds, The Thatcher Effect (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp.
239–50; Ivor Crewe and Donald D. Searing, ‘Ideological Change in the British Conservative Party’,
American Political Science Review, 82 (1988), 361–84; Anthony Heath, Roger Jowell and John Curtice,
How Britain Votes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985); Anthony Heath, John Curtice, Roger Jowell,
Geoffrey Evans, Julia Field and Sharon Witherspoon, Understanding Political Change: The British Voter
1964–1987 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1991).
44 The dyad ratios algorithm has no analytic solution for standard errors of the annual estimates. We
proceed instead by bootstrapping. We ﬁrst introduce variation by re-sampling our raw data. Instead of
the ﬁxed percentage reported by a survey organization, r, we take a draw for each (non-missing) item and
year from a distribution which is normal with mean r and a standard deviation given by the sampling
error of r, s5O[r(100 2 r)/N]. This allows us to repeat the estimation of the latent series as many times
as we wish, each sampling slightly different data and returning different results. The standard deviations
for each period of all those independent replications, 1,000 in the case at hand, become the standard error
estimates that we report. We have not yet been able to establish why the errors are larger towards the end
of the series.
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On the face of it, preferences appear to be divided into three distinct periods: moving to
the right from the 1950s through to 1979, to the left between 1979 and 1997 and back to the
right since 1997. From what we know of British political history, and informed by Wlezien’s
thermostatic model, it is tempting to link this pattern to variations in the size of the state,
which generally expanded in the ﬁrst period, contracted in the second and then rolled
forward again in the third.45 It is likely, however, that more directly economic factors also
were at play. In the next sections, we examine the validity of the extracted measure by
considering which variables are most heavily associated with the estimated series and also its
relationship with both left–right self-locations and attitudes towards Europe.
Dimensional analysis. While the picture provided by Figure 1 is generally quite plausible,
we need to establish whether the estimates are indeed capturing left–right preferences and
movements in the centre. One obvious way of establishing whether our estimated series is
indeed capturing preferences for government activity is to examine the loadings for those
individual items that make up the scale. Given that the series is based on 349 items asked
in 2,482 separate administrations, it would be too messy to display all the loadings. Some
items are, moreover, included only twice. While such items would have factor loadings of
1.0 (or 21.0), they would provide a misleading indicator of content. Table 2, therefore,
simply reports the highest loadings for only those items that were included in the database
on at least ten occasions and load more than 0.50 on the public preferences dimension.46
The ﬁrst thing to note about Table 2 is that the estimated preference series explains over
43 per cent of the variation in these assorted series. Given the very large number of items,
this seems – to us at any rate – quite impressive. More importantly, however, even a brief
examination of Table 2 is enough to demonstrate that it is dominated by items relating to
trade unions, to the power of business, to taxing and spending and to equality, while the
welfare estate, the monarchy and nuclear power also load highly on the scale.
This provides some reassurance that the series is capturing a large part of the battle
between Labour and the Conservatives about the extent of state activity. Indeed, we
would have been surprised if we had found anything else. It should also be noted,
however, that some items that are only remotely related to government activity (such as
nuclear power, post-materialism and abortion) also load heavily on the extracted
dimension. Put simply, when overall preferences move, so do things that one might think
were totally unrelated. This suggests that the extracted dimension is actually picking up
something rather more general than preferences for government activity.
Relationship with self-reported left–right positions. The dimensional analysis contained in
Table 2 suggests that the estimate of public preferences reﬂects a general left–right dimension.
But a sceptic might well demand additional conﬁrmation. In this sub-section, we assess the
relationship between the series and other measures of left-right position. We are fortunate
that the Eurobarometer has asked respondents to report their own left–right positions every
year since 1973.47 In addition, Gallup and the BES also asked similar questions, somewhat
less regularly, in this same period. These series can be combined to generate a single left–right
45 Wlezien, ‘The Public as Thermostat’.
46 The full factor loadings for the 349 items are available from the authors on request.
47 The earlier British Election Studies also asked about the reported left–right position, but the ﬁlter
question generated so much missing data that the resulting marginals were not included in our database.
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self-placement series using the same extraction algorithm used for the preference series, and
we can then examine its relationship with the extracted series (see Figure 2).
Figure 2 also displays the preferences series and self-reported left–right positions from 1973
onwards.48 This ﬁgure shows that the two series track each other quite well, though reported
positions continued to increase (move leftwards) between 1997 and 2002, when policy
preferences were decreasing (moving right). This suggests that self-reported positions might
be a lagging indicator.49 It may simply be that voters who have voted for a ‘left’ party in 1997
TABLE 2 Dimensional Analysis of Preferences Series, 1950–2005
Question House N Loading
Trade-union power Gallup 22 0.96
Trade-union power MORI 15 0.98
Nuclear energy Gallup 10 0.93
Tax and spending Gallup 20 0.93
Trade unions good Gallup 40 0.89
Trade unions extreme MORI 14 0.88
Trade-union closed shop Gallup 11 0.83
People don’t deserve beneﬁts Gallup 15 0.83
Tax and spending BSA 21 0.81
Ordinary people get fair share BSA 16 0.79
Post materialism Eurobarometer 22 0.79
One law for the rich, another for the poor BSA 19 0.77
Welfare beneﬁts BSA 15 0.75
Equal opportunities for women BES/BSA 10 0.74
Better off without monarchy MORI 12 0.73
Class struggle BES 14 0.73
Trade unions essential MORI 15 0.73
Pension spending Gallup 20 0.72
Unemployed could get jobs BSA 15 0.72
Business too powerful BES 10 0.69
Abortion if poor BSA 11 0.67
Redistribution of wealth BSA 19 0.66
Car taxes higher BSA 14 0.64
Keep monarch BSA 10 0.59
Trade-union power BSA 18 0.58
Unemployed ﬁddle dole BSA 15 0.55
Limit availability of NHS BSA 17 0.54
Welfare spending BSA 15 0.52
Reduce income differences BSA 10 0.52
Abortion if don’t want child BSA 10 0.51
Obey wrong laws BSA 15 0.51
Business beneﬁts owners BSA 17 0.50
Note: This table contains only those items that are entered into the database in ten separate
administrations and have a loading above 0.5.
48 The latter, it should be remembered, is not included in the former.
49 Some indication that this is the case is provided by a simple regression of current preferences and
current self-reported left–right position on the same indicators lagged one year. In the model of self-
reported positions, lagged self-reported left–right positions and lagged policy preferences are correctly
signed and statistically signiﬁcant. In the model of current preferences, both lagged preferences and lagged
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and 2001 assume that they must be left too or that social desirability is at play. In any case,
the product moment correlation for the two series is an impressive 0.66 (N533, p, 0.000).
Movements of reported left–right positions are associated with ‘real’ preferences.
It should be ﬁnally noted that the correlation between our measure of preferences for
government activity without reported left–right positions and the same measure with self-
reported positions over the thirty-two years between 1973 and 2005 is a mighty 0.99. It seems
that the decision to exclude self-reported left–right positions is more ﬁrmly rooted in
intuitions about the meaning of ‘preferences’ than in the data. This ﬁnding suggests that
where preference data are in short supply (in studies of preferences in other countries, for
example), changes in self-reported positions might be useful proxies for changes in aggregate
preferences.
Relationship with European Preferences. It is unclear whether positions on the European
issue are essentially ‘domestic’ or ‘international’ in nature and thus their relationship with
‘left’ and ‘right’ is, furthermore, uncertain. For these reasons, we excluded those items
that referred to Europe from the dataset we used to generate our estimates of preferences
relating to government activity. Instead, we set these data aside and employed the dyad
ratio algorithm to produce a pure measure of latent attitudes towards Europe.
Figure 2 displays preferences relating to Europe from 1961 onwards. The association
between the two series in this case does not appear to be quite as good as that for self-
reported left–right positions. Nevertheless, the two series generally ﬁt quite well. The
1970s, on the one hand, witnessed a drift to the right in terms of both preferences and a
drift towards Euroscepticism. The 1980s, on the other hand, witnessed a drift to the left
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(F’note continued)
self-reported left–right positions are signiﬁcant, but the latter is incorrectly signed, suggesting that if they
were rising one year ago, preferences fall. Self-reported left–right positions: Constant523.23 (2.95)*,
Lagged preferences5 0.82 (0.08), Lagged self-reported positions5 0.26 (0.06), Adjusted R25 0.93,
N5 31; Public preferences: Constant5 3.73* (2.47), Lagged preferences5 1.09 (0.07), Lagged self-
reported positions520.16 (0.05), Adjusted R25 0.93, N5 31 (*Not signiﬁcant at p, 0.05, two-tailed).
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and increasing support for Europe that reversed itself from around 1991 onwards. The
early to mid-1990s combined a slight shift to the left with increased Euroscepticism. From
1997 onwards, the two series marched in step: towards the right and Eurosceptical poles.
Yet again, the real test is the correlation between the two series. The product moment
correlation for the two is 0.54 (N5 45, p, 0.000). Although it has been suggested that
Europe represents a new dimension of British politics, quite separate from the ‘old’
politics of left and right, the data suggest that there is an association between the two.50
Figure 2 suggests that our exclusion of reported left–right positions and the European
items is more ﬁrmly rooted in theoretical considerations than in the data. If we had
included the European data in our indicator of preferences, it would have made little
difference. The correlation between the two series with and without European items is
0.98. The decision to exclude the European data – like left–right self-reported positions –
makes virtually no empirical difference.
Naming the series. We have noted that items relating to taxation, spending and state
activity loom large in the preferences series. Since other issues traditionally associated
with left and right, such as abortion, nuclear power and post-materialism, also load
heavily on the series and since it correlates quite highly with self-reported left–right
positions, there seem to be grounds for believing that we have produced a plausible
general measure of left–right positions. Indeed, perhaps we should not ﬁnd this surprising.
Theories of ‘issue evolution’ produce the clear expectation that many – even most – issues
will eventually be incorporated in the left–right dimension as parties take positions and
voters sort themselves into the right parties.51 While we are reasonably conﬁdent that we
have a measure of general left–right positions, we leave it to the reader to decide whether
our ﬁndings support that proposition.
WHAT MOVES PREFERENCES?
We have shown that preferences move left and right over time. Here, we take on the
challenge of explaining why. Most of the movements are small. Indeed, the average
annual change, ignoring the sign of the change, is a mere 1.5 points over the full ﬁfty-six
years examined here. The largest annual changes occur in 1960–61 (26.1) and 1964–65
(25.7), but this may owe a good deal to the thinness of the data at that period (see Figure
1). Beyond this, there is little to suggest that individual events may have affected
preferences a great deal. Indeed, such a pattern of small but cumulative change strongly
hints at the inﬂuence of systemic, macro-level forces.
Theory
To get beneath the longitudinal ﬂow of issue preferences, it is useful to think about the
cross-sectional distribution of preferences. Assume that Britain faces a continuing choice
of more or fewer government activities and services and the taxes to pay for them.52
50 Paul Webb, The Modern British Party System (London: Sage, 2000), chap. 3; Geoffrey Evans,
‘Europe: A New Cleavage?’ in Geoffrey Evans and Pippa Norris, eds, Critical Elections: British Parties
and Voters in Long-term Perspective (London: Sage, 1999), pp. 207–22.
51 See Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson, Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of
American Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989); Stimson, Tides of Consent, chap. 3.
52 See Evan Davies, Public Spending (London: Penguin, 1998).
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The extremes of this choice, anarchy at one end and total government at the other,
are never attained. Thus, we may think of arraying all citizens into degrees of preferring
more or less government and dividing this space of preferences into three groupings, those
who want more government than Labour provides, those who want less than the
Conservatives provide, and those somewhere in between.53
Now, in this hypothetical space, it will be clear that the groups of the extreme left (who
want more government than Labour provides) and those of the extreme right (who similarly
want less than they ever get from Conservatives) will never be satisﬁed. Thus, their views
should never change. Wanting more (or less) and never getting it implies that they should
always continue to want more (or less). That leaves those in between the parties as the only
citizens who have a motive to change preferences over time. As control of government
alternates between the party of the left and the party of the right, they will see themselves
forced to change relative preferences in order to stay constant in absolute terms.54
Imagine a citizen in between but relatively close to the Conservatives in preferences.
While Conservatives hold power, that citizen will prefer (slightly) more government than
he or she gets. When Labour takes control, it will increase the mix of services and taxes
and our citizen will soon ﬁnd that the government is doing more than he or she wished
and will need to switch relative preferences to less.
In this story of absolute and relative preferences for the size of government, it is clear that
for a rational citizenry the dynamic element is entirely in the middle. Therefore, as we
aggregate these preferences and observe them over time, we should observe (1) that all the
action is in the centre, and (2) that the dynamics will produce the thermostatic response that
Christopher Wlezien hypothesizes.55 If we can envision the sum total of public policy on a
dimension of more or less government – easy in theory and a little challenging for empirical
measurement – then our basic expectation is that citizens will respond to government over
time by demanding less of the direction of policy that they are currently receiving.
On to this expectation, which is entirely endogenous to the choices that governments
make, we will observe also some factors which are relatively exogenous. Chief among
these will be movements in the macro-economy which are capable of altering (absolute)
preferences for the level of government. A government experiencing high levels of
unemployment, for example, will lead some citizens to prefer a higher level of government
activity as a Keynesian response. Thus, independently of our hypothesized timeless basic
level of preferred government, some citizens will shift leftwards for a period of time
when government is seen as not doing enough to cope with the economic difﬁculty of
unemployment. Inﬂation provides the reverse case. To the degree that it may be attributed
to excess stimulation by government, some citizens might for a period of time rationally
prefer less government as a policy response.
From this simple story, we may now formulate empirical expectations of how our
observed relative preferences for more or less government will shift over time. Most
basically, we expect such preferences to run counter to the dominant ﬂow of policy
making, moving left in response to policy of the right and moving right in response to
53 Since Britain has three major parties, not two, we see the Liberal Democrats complicating the picture
by sometimes falling between the other two parties and sometimes emphasizing different issues. We ignore
the complication.
54 See Stanley Feldman and John R. Zaller, ‘The Political Culture of Ambivalence: Ideological
Responses to the Welfare State’, American Journal of Political Science, 36 (1992), 268–307.
55 Wlezien, ‘The Public as Thermostat’, pp. 985–9.
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policy of the left. We will take two empirical approaches to this issue. We ﬁrst expect the
direction of preferences to shift in response to party control – which assumes implicitly
that parties do what they are supposed to do, Conservatives reducing government and
Labour increasing it, which is not always true. Then we will assess our macro-level
explanations starting ﬁrst with economic factors, which predict that unemployment will
increase support for government activity and inﬂation will reduce it. And ﬁnally, we will
introduce empirical indicators of our size of government concept, average tax levels and
government expenditure as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP).
Analysis
Parties may be ignorant of public opinion, and they may in any case pursue their
ideological goals without constant reference to it. In these circumstances, we might expect
parties of the left to provide too much government activity and governments of the right
too little. In line with Christopher Wlezien’s thermostat model, we expect that preferences
should move left under the Conservatives and right under Labour.
Figure 3 summarizes the changes in preferences under Conservative and Labour
governments. This provides some qualiﬁed support for the thermostat idea.56 The
preference series certainly moved right under Labour governments in 1974–79 and in
1997–2005 (see Figure 3). It also moved left under the eighteen years of Conservative rule
from 1979 to 1997. Curiously, however, the pattern of changes under the three governments
between 1950 and 1974 are in exactly the wrong direction. Preferences move right under the
Conservatives in two periods, 1951–64 and 1970–74, and marginally left under Labour in
1964–70. Therefore, we need to take a more systematic look at the phenomenon. For that,
we turn to a regression analysis predicting movements of our estimated centre.
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
Years and Party
1979-97 Con1951-64 Con 1964-70 Lab 1970-74 Con 1974-79 Lab 1997-2005 Lab
Fig. 3. Changes in preferences for each government, 1951–2005
56 Wlezien, ‘The Public as Thermostat’.
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We begin our analyses with the simple question of the effect of party control. Although
parties can and do vary in the degree to which they pursue distinctive policies, a voter could do
reasonably well using the heuristic that Conservatives will tend to reduce the size of
government and Labour will tend to increase it. Thus, the simple fact of party control might
summarize the idea that preferences move contrary to the dominant direction of policy making.
The most basic test of this idea is simply to ask whether the direction of change in
preferences responds to the party of government.57 We expect the public to move left
under Conservative rule and right under Labour. We can tap this with a regression of
change of preferences on a party dummy variable (05Conservative, 15Labour). An
initial result is displayed in column 1 of Table 3.
What we see is a result that is correctly signed but not conventionally signiﬁcant (p, 0.08).
The reference category (Conservative) shows changes towards the left (positive sign), albeit
very slight, while the Labour category predicts movements towards the right (negative sign).
Given what we have seen in Figure 3, this comes as no surprise. During the era of ‘consensus
politics’, when Conservative and Labour broadly agreed on the need for a mixed economy
and government activity, governments of both parties did things more usually associated with
the other party. The governments of the 1950s and early 1960s produced responses sometimes
opposite to those predicted by their ideology. The Conservatives expanded state activity in
the immediate post-war period and co-operated with the trade unions between 1951 and
1964.58 The 1970–74 Heath government initially tried to reduce government activity and then
massively expanded it in a famous policy ‘U-turn’.59 Equally, the Labour government
between 1964 and 1970 had to cut its ambitious spending plans, abandon its ‘national plan’
and tried to introduce legal restraints on the trade unions.60
In the second column of Table 3, we restrict analysis to the period beginning in 1974 and
pose the same question. For the last thirty-two year period, the expected effect emerges
and quite strongly.61 The coefﬁcients indicate that every year of Conservative government
drives preferences about 0.80 to the left and every year of Labour government pushes
TABLE 3 Effects of Party Control of Government on Changes in Preferences
Variable 1. All years 2. 1974–2005
Intercept (Conservative) 0.06 0.81*
(0.33) (0.28)
Incumbent Party Dummy (Labour5 1) 20.79 21.97*
(0.55) (0.43)
N 55 32
R2 0.04 0.41
*p, 0.01.
57 A Dickey–Fuller test indicates the presence of a unit root in the preferences series. So, henceforth, we
will work with ﬁrst differences in the series or analogously employ an error correction formulation which
is appropriate for integrated time series.
58 Kavanagh, Thatcherism and British Politics, chaps 3–4.
59 Jenkins, Mrs Thatcher’s Revolution, chap. 1.
60 Clive Ponting, Breach of Promise (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1989).
61 We have also considered analysis of the longer period, 1965–2005. That produces a compromise
result where the effects are also highly signiﬁcant, but less sharp than the shorter period of Table 3.
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preferences even more strongly to the right (21.97). But our theory is more general. The
party dummy variable approach is a crude indicator of the size of government idea. We
can do better.
To do so, we need to introduce direct measures of policy making and of economic
effects. For economics theory dictates the choice of indicators. We have argued that
unemployment shifts net preferences to the left and inﬂation shifts them to the right.
Here, we examine those effects.
Since we are dealing with a unit root dependent variable (preferences), we employ the
error correction framework for analysis. Error correction models assume that the major
path of causality between two variables is that the explanatory variables create a dynamic
equilibrium for the variable to be explained.62 Lacking a ﬁxed mean to which it
equilibrates, that is, a unit root variable is thought to equilibrate to a level dependent on
the level of the causal series. Thus, when disturbed by some exogenous event or condition,
it will tend to equilibrate, but to the dynamic target set by the explanatory variable, not to
a ﬁxed mean. The evidence for such dynamic equilibration is in two forms (1) that
signiﬁcant linear relationships are observed between the level of the explanatory series and
change in the dependent series (the ‘long-term’ effects of Table 4), and (2) the error
correction phenomenon, that changes in the dependent variable are negatively related to
its previous deviations from dynamic equilibrium.63
We begin the analysis of economic effects in Table 4. There, in the column labelled
‘Economics’, we observe the long-term (and short-term) effects of unemployment and
inﬂation on the ﬁrst differences of preferences. We expect positive long-term effects for
unemployment and negative ones for inﬂation. That is what can be seen in Table 4. But the
effects are weak. The error correction is at the margin of signiﬁcance, the unemployment
effect right on the line (p, 0.052), and the inﬂation long-term effect is correctly signed but not
signiﬁcant. Predicting ﬁrst differences is a very challenging task, and therefore it is hard to
know whether an adjusted R2 of 0.16 represents success or failure. Overall, we have a hint
that economics matters for preferences, but the evidence is far from conclusive.
We do, however, also have two indicators of policy making that might add to our story
and permit a more general test of Christopher Wlezien’s thermostatic theory. We measure
the beneﬁt side of government with government expenditures as a proportion of GDP.64
The cost side of government is measured with average income tax.65 For both measures,
62 Walter Enders, Applied Econometric Time Series (Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley, 2004), chap. 6; Jeffrey M.
Wooldridge, Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach (Mason, Ohio: Thomson, South Western,
2006), chap. 18; Peter Kennedy, A Guide to Econometrics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), chap. 19.
63 Short-term relationships between Dx and Dy may also be observed, but are relatively uncommon
with unit root dependent series.
64 We were unable to ﬁnd a single measure of government expenditure as a proportion of GDP for the
whole period 1950–2005. Therefore, we collected a series of overlapping indicators from a variety of
sources and used the extraction algorithm to estimate a single series. The longest single-source period was
found in G. White and H. Chapman, ‘Long-term Trends in Public Expenditure’, Economic Trends, 408
(1987), pp. 124–8; but we also used HM Treasury, OECD and Eurostat. These resulting series explained:
86.85 per cent of the variation in the data had a mean of 39.64 and a standard deviation of 3.42. The
complete original dataset, together with the extraction output, is available from the authors on request.
65 The measure of average income tax is based on analyses carried out by Frances Lynch and her
colleagues at the University of Westminster. It measures average income tax levels for speciﬁed ‘typical’
individuals (see Paul Johnson, Frances Lynch and John Geoffrey Walker, ‘Income Tax and Elections in
Britain, 1950–2001’, Electoral Studies, 24 (2005), 393–408). One of the most striking features of debates
about tax in Britain is the extent to which debate resolves around income tax, even though it generates a
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we expect negative long-term effects. Bigger government, that is, should push preferences
to the right.
What we observe in Table 4 instead is explanatory failure. The adjusted R2 of 0.01 tells
us what we would also see from the coefﬁcients, that we just have no evidence that (at
least taken by itself) the size of government predicts preferences. These outcome variables
are perhaps a step too far down the causal chain. They result from the cumulated policies
of many governments over a very long span of time and do not necessarily tell us the
recent drift of policy making, which may be more inﬂuential in driving preferences. With a
product moment correlation between them of 0.75, multicollinearity also impedes
observing separate effects.
We consider a model which includes both sets of variables in the third column. Here, it
becomes clear that both sets are required for a well-speciﬁed model. With a better model
ﬁt (R25 0.18), the long-term effect of unemployment emerges as a highly signiﬁcant cause
TABLE 4 Predicting Change in Preferences (Error Correction Models)
Variable Economics Size of government Both sets Removing inﬂation
Unemployment
Short-term 20.09 20.52 20.68
(0.33) (0.45) (0.38)
Long-term 0.15 0.41** 0.47**
(0.09) (0.16) (0.14)
Inﬂation
Short-term 20.03 0.05
(0.09) (0.10)
Long-term 20.09 20.09
(0.08) (0.10)
Average income tax
Short-term 0.00 0.38 0.39
(0.24) (0.26) (0.25)
Long-term 20.13 20.38* 20.40**
(0.14) (0.16) (0.15)
Gov’t expenditure
Short-term 20.37 0.07 0.18
(0.25) (0.30) (0.27)
Long-term 0.02 20.17 20.25
(0.15) (0.21) (0.18)
Error correction 20.11 20.17 20.39** 20.38***
(0.07) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
Intercept 5.55 10.11 32.38*** 34.62***
(4.32) (10.33) (12.68) (11.90)
N 55 51 51 51
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.01 0.18 0.20
*p, 0.05, **p, 0.01, ***p, 0.00.
(F’note continued)
relatively small proportion of government revenue. We have been provided with the data for male single
industrial workers only. It is clear from Figure 2 in Johnson et al., ‘Income Tax and Elections in Britain’,
that this correlates very well with average tax levels for married industrial workers too. These estimates
are available only up to 2001, with the consequence that N falls to 51.
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of preference changes as does long-term average taxes. The multicollinear government
spending indicator remains correctly signed but non-signiﬁcant. And inﬂation, as before,
is correctly signed but not powerful enough to attain statistical signiﬁcance.
The error correction speciﬁcation, predicting ﬁrst differences instead of the level of
a series, combined with indicator multicollinearity, can lead to under-appreciation of
the true strength of relationships. For another and simpler look at the data, we graph
preferences against government spending in Figure 4. This time reversed to indicate right
sentiment (i.e., 100 – left), it is quite clear in the graph that government spending and
Conservative sentiment move in tandem (r5 0.75). Conservative governments, by cutting
government spending, and Labour ones, by increasing it, both seem to sow the seeds of
their own demise in policy making. The observed empirical fact of cycles of party control
of government may now be seen as the expected outcome of governments pursuing their
policy goals instead of heeding the moderating signal of public opinion. It is regularly
observed that electorates often express the view that it is time for a change and that there
seems to be a political pendulum at work. In this view, however, the pendulum is neither
exogenous nor a valence issue but instead the predictable result of macro politics.
For a ﬁnal test, we remove inﬂation from the speciﬁcation and re-estimate the remainder
of the terms. This results in strengthening both the unemployment and average tax long-term
effects and improving the ﬁt slightly to 0.20. What we now know is that preferences are in a
dynamic relationship with unemployment rates and with the size of government (with either
indicator separately or average taxes jointly). That means that those two variables set an
appropriate target level for preferences. And it tells us that when actual preferences move
away from that target, they tend to correct back to it fairly rapidly. The estimated error
correction rate (0.38) tells us that almost 40 per cent of any deviation of preferences from
the target rate in either direction is corrected within one year.66 Public preferences do
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Fig. 4. The relationship between preferences for government activity and public expenditure
Note: The preference series is reversed (100—left) to measure right sentiment.
66 We have two alternative paths by which preferences might be related to levels of government spending
and taxing. In one, preferences at earlier times affected election results and altered the control of government.
So current spending may be a positive function of preferences at various lags. The thermostatic hypothesis
introduces a different path. Current electorates react to the current and previous size of government mix
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respond to the size of government and to the state of the national economy. Ivor Crewe’s
observation that British elections are a matter of ‘the economy and public services, stupid’
seems to apply equally to preferences.67 And since the British state provides things that
are in the United States provided by the market, this apparent difference from the United
States makes some sense.
SO WHAT? A FIRST LOOK AT PREFERENCES AND ELECTIONS
A natural reaction to the results in the previous section is, so what? While we believe that
preferences are important things to study in themselves, most readers are interested in
them only in so far as they inﬂuence election outcomes.68 In this penultimate section, we
examine brieﬂy the relationship between preferences and elections. Before we do so,
however, it is worth noting that there are some reasons not to expect a direct relationship
between opinion and elections. Politicians are generally smart operators with a real
incentive to learn about voters. If opinion is shifting, they are likely to respond and close
the distance if at all possible (though they may face tight ideological constraints). As
modellers, moreover, we face a series of obstacles. If spatial theories of elections are to be
believed, electoral outcomes are driven by the distance between parties and the average or
median voter. To construct a model of election outcomes, therefore, we need both a valid
measure of party positions and some way of mapping voters and parties onto the same
scale. This is a large task and one that we must necessarily postpone to another paper.69
Nevertheless, the preference series displayed in Figure 2 provides an interesting
perspective on election outcomes. As David Butler has suggested, elections ‘have
registered the change of mood that events and political rhetoric have wrought, month by
month, in the voters’ minds.’70 It is clear, however, that changes in preferences often long
pre-date election outcomes. Both Mrs Thatcher’s victory in 1979 and New Labour’s
triumph in 1997 are fully anticipated in the series. Nevertheless, it seems that preferences
in 1979 (the year of Mrs Thatcher’s ﬁrst election) were not very different, for example,
from those in 1974 (the year of Labour’s two narrow victories).71 James Callaghan’s
(F’note continued)
negatively. As government grows, they move to the right in response. As it declines, they move to the left. So
when we observe a statistical connection between them, are we observing a web of endogeneity or can the two
be sorted out? They differ in two important respects, which is helpful to sorting out causality claims. In
timing, the logic requires the ﬁrst path to associate changes in government only with lagged values of
preferences. It is previous elections that put the current government in power. The thermostatic effect is the
reverse; the electorate cannot react to changes in government until those changes have occurred, and
therefore current preferences should reﬂect only previous policy. The second difference is the important
matter of sign. One relationship, preferences - elections - policy, is positive; the other, policy - (2)
preferences, is negative. Thus, the data can help sort out alternative interpretations. The sign and time order
that we observe supports only the second, thermostatic, interpretation. We cannot rule out that the ﬁrst path
might exist. But if it does, it is too weak to leave behind evidence.
67 Ivor Crewe, ‘Now relax, it’s a dead cert’, New Statesman, 12 February 2001. See also Anthony King,
‘Why Labour Won – At Last’, in Anthony King, ed., New Labour Triumphs: Britain at the Polls, 1997
(Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1998), pp. 177–207.
68 Stimson, Public Opinion in America, p. 98.
69 See Erikson et al., The Macro Polity, chap. 7.
70 David Butler, ‘Reﬂections on British Elections and Their Study’, Annual Review of Political Science,
1 (1998), 451–64, p. 455.
71 Labour actually obtained a lower share of the vote in February 1974 but obtained 301 seats to the
Conservatives’ 296. It obtained a tiny majority of just ﬁve seats in the subsequent election of October 1974.
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fatalism in spring 1979 may have reﬂected not only his (then recent) experiences during
the Winter of Discontent, but the cumulative realization that public support for
government activity had been eroded over the preceding thirty years.
Equally, preferences in 1997 (the year of New Labour’s victory) do not look so very
different from those ﬁve years earlier (when the Conservative party won a fourth
consecutive victory). This latter ﬁnding may help explain why the electorate turned
against the Conservatives so quickly – and so decisively – after the ‘Black Wednesday’
crisis in September 1992. Kenneth Newton suggested that the 1992 election campaign was
in many ways a contest between ‘caring’ (Labour) and ‘competence’ (Conservative).72 It
may simply be that many had voted Conservative in April 1992 despite their ideological
dispositions. Many voters did ‘care’ about unemployment and the state of the public
services but concluded that the Conservatives would be more ‘competent’ when it came to
managing the economy than their Labour rivals. If this is true, then many voted
Conservative with a heavy heart and may have felt like fools when Britain was forced to
leave the ERM in September 1992. What may have hitherto been missing from accounts
of ‘Black Wednesday’ is the observation that the electorate’s ‘hearts’ were with Labour
in 1992, though many were undoubtedly eventually ruled by their ‘heads’ and voted
Conservative. Equally, while David Sanders is clearly correct in arguing that New
Labour’s victory in 1997 owed much to its move to the centre between 1992 and 1997, it
also owed a great deal to the shift in preferences that had happened by 1992.73
To bring the story up to date, it appears that some of Labour’s losses in 2001 and 2005
may well be due to shifts in preferences. We know that preferences fell from around 58 in
1997 to approximately 49 points in 2005 (presumably as a result of the massive increases
in spending and taxation following on from Gordon Brown’s comprehensive spending
review in August 2000).74 The Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) analyses suggest
that Labour moved left slightly between 1997 and 2001 and again between 2001 and
2005.75 These shifts in party position were not large, but – when coupled with the drift to
the right in preferences documented in Figure 2 – it seems plausible to suggest that
Labour’s losses may owe something to the increasing ‘distance’ between themselves and
the electorate.76 To be sure, they may also be the result of a diminished valence advantage
and the negative effects of the Iraq War. The evidence from our preference series,
however, certainly hints at an additional proximity factor. And the reasons for this
increased distance were movement by both the party and the electorate.
In due course, we hope to produce a single model of election outcomes for the period
between 1950 and 2005. This will represent the closest thing approximating to a general
model of elections that has yet been produced in Britain. It may then be possible to run
simulations that will help resolve nagging questions, such as whether New Labour’s shift to
‘the centre’ was necessary for it to win in 1997. As we have noted, however, that will require
the imposition of some additional assumptions and is, therefore, a matter for further research.
72 Kenneth Newton, ‘Caring and Competence’, in Anthony King, ed., Britain at the Polls, 1992
(Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1992).
73 David Sanders, ‘The New Electoral Battleground’, in Anthony King, ed., New Labour Triumphs:
Britain at the Polls (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1998), p. 217.
74 Polly Toynbee and David Walker, Did Things Get Better? An Audit of Labour’s Successes and
Failures (London: Penguin Books, 2001), p. 104.
75 Information provided by Judith Bara (Queen Mary and Westﬁeld College, University of London).
76 See John Bartle, The New British Politics: Election Update (Harlow: Longman, 2005), p. 22.
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CONCLUSIONS
In recent years, political scientists are rightly concerned with replication and the need to
demonstrate that empirical generalizations hold across time and space.77 It is heartening,
therefore, that this article has provided corroboration of studies of the US macro polity.78
It has, for example, demonstrated that it is possible to track shifts in the political centre in
Britain between using hard evidence drawn from survey data rather than – as was so often
the case in the past – informed speculation. It has also demonstrated that – just as in the
United States – the centre appears to move over long periods of time and that it moves in
response to government activity. And it has gone beyond these US studies by examining
the role of taxation and spending. When unemployment has risen or the share of the
national wealth devoted to public spending has declined, the electorate has, on average,
moved left. When taxes and spending have increased, the electorate has, on average
shifted right. This provides support for Christopher Wlezien’s thermostatic conception of
public opinion generalized across the whole of government activity.79 It also provides an
explanation of the ‘costs of ruling’: the tendency of governments to lose support whatever
the state of the economy.80 This may be partly the result of governing parties following
their ideological convictions about the scope of government activity. It will certainly be
interesting to see whether these ﬁndings hold in other European countries and whether
government spending has the same effect in the United States.
Our ﬁndings suggest that students of political behaviour should pay greater attention to
those large-scale movements of opinion that occur over the long haul. It is all too easy to
dismiss minor changes in survey marginal responses, but when these take place across a
wide range of speciﬁc issues, they may tell us that something important is under way.81
Movements in public preferences may provide clues about both the likely direction of
policy and electoral outcomes (though this is a matter for future research). These sorts of
macro-level analyses provide an interesting and – to our minds – compelling alternative
perspective to the more familiar micro-level studies. And, quite unlike such individual-
level studies, they permit us to examine the origins of those preferences and their relation
to real or objectively measured causes, such as the economy.
Taken as a whole, these ﬁndings also provide support for the proposition that one can
agree that the average citizen is not particularly informed, not particularly thoughtful,
and not particularly attentive, but still ﬁnd these characteristics emerge in the aggregate.82
The apparent responsiveness of preferences to government activity does something
to salvage the reputation of the electorate. Our analyses provide clear evidence for
the proposition that the electorate – when taken as an aggregate whole – is responsive to
real outcomes.83
77 Gary King, ‘Replication Replication’, PS: Political Science and Politics, 3 (1995), 443–99.
78 Erikson et al., The Macro Polity, chaps 6 and 7.
79 Wlezien, ‘The Public as Thermostat’ and ‘Patterns of Representation’.
80 Martin Paldam, ‘The Distribution of Election Results and Two Explanations of the Costs of Ruling’,
European Journal of Political Economy, 2 (1986), 5–24; Martin Paldam and Peter Skott, ‘A Rational Voter
Explanation of the Cost of Ruling’, Public Choice, 83 (1995),159–72; Peter Naanstead and Martin
Paldam, ‘The Costs of Ruling’, in Han Dorussen and Michael Taylor, eds, Economic Voting (London:
Routledge, 2002), pp. 17–44.
81 Stimson, Public Opinion in America and Tides of Consent.
82 Erikson et al., The Macro Polity, p. 5.
83 Converse, ‘Popular Representation and the Distribution of Information’.
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The political centre is a concept of enormous analytical importance and the estimates
provided here can be used in a wide range of research. In our own research, we intend to
provide more analyses of the dimensions underlying the preferences.84 We will assess the
impact of party proximity to the political centre on aggregate vote share (and possibly
approval of the government’s record). Ultimately, of course, we also wish to assess the
quality of representation by determining the relationship between preferences and
government activity. Only then will we be able to assess whether there is indeed a
necessary relationship between what the public wants and what they actually get.
84 John Bartle, Sebastian Dellepiane and James A. Stimson, ‘The Dimensionality of British Political
Preferences, 1950–2005’ (paper presented at the 5th ECPR General Conference, Potsdam, 2009).
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